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We investigate the cost allocation strategy associated
with the problem of providing some network service
from source to a number of users, via the Minimum
Cost Steiner Tree Network that spans the source and all
the receivers. The cost of such a Steiner tree network,
is distributed among its receivers. The objective of
this paper is to develop a reasonably fair and compu-
tationally efficient cost allocation rule associated with
the above cost allocation problem. Since finding the
optimal Steiner tree is an NP-hard problem, the input to
our cost allocation problem is the best known solution
obtained using some heuristic. In order to allocate the
cost of this Steiner tree to the users (receiver nodes),
we formulate the associated Steiner Tree Network (STN)
game in characteristic function form. It is well known
that the core of the general STN game might be empty.
We propose a new cost allocation rule for the modified
STN game which might be attractive to network users
due to its monotonic properties, associated with network
growth.
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1. Introduction
Consider a connected directed network. As-
sume that a common source provides a service,
which is required by users residing at some net-
work nodes, and assume that any node receiving
the service can in turn deliver it to its adjacent
nodes. Each user is required to be connected,
perhaps through other (switching) nodes, to the
common source. With each edge (link) we as-
sociate the cost of using that edge to provide
service. The set of users should be linked to the
common source at a minimum cost. We refer
to this problem as to the Minimum Cost Steiner
Tree Network problem. This is an extensively
studied problem in computer science and oper-
ations research which appears in many appli-
cations. Some applications include distribution
networks, e.g. multicast routing (broadcasting
financial information for example), water sup-
ply, electricity, internet services, cablevision,
design of VSLI, and design of optical and wire-
less communication networks.
It is well known that finding an optimal Steiner
tree in networks is a computationally prohibitive
problem, and numerous researchers and practi-
tioners have proposed various exact and heuris-
tic approaches to solve it. It appears that in some
practical application the rapid network changes
requiring quick computation makes search for
the “optimal solution” less attractive and the
quicker heuristic is often used instead. (For a
set of related articles and surveys see for exam-
ple, [1,2] and [3]). The example of such a quick
heuristic is a minimum cost spanning tree based
heuristic which simply finds a minimum cost
spanning tree spanning all nodes (receivers and
Steiner nodes) and then prunes (eliminates) all
Steiner nodes that are leafs. Herein, we will use
this heuristic whenever the network is expanded
by the addition of some new nodes.
In this paper, we are concerned with network
cost allocation. The cost of a service network
is shared by users who possibly have conflict-
ing objectives. They might cooperate in order
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to decrease their joint cost if they are charged
a “fair share” of the cost. There is no general
answer to the fairness issue for network cost
allocation problems. Cooperative game the-
ory has been used to analyze several classes
of network problems in the literature. An of-
ten used approach is to formulate the associated
cost allocation problem as a cooperative game
in characteristic function form, followed by the
evaluation of various game theoretic solution
concepts in the context of a particular problem.
The examples related to work herein include:
spanning tree games [4], Steiner tree games [5]
and [6], network flow games [7], cost allocation
arising from routing in networks [8], capaci-
tated network design games [9] and [10], and
hub network games [11] and [12]. For a survey
and references on combinatorial cost allocation
models in networks see for example [13,14].
Central to the cooperative game theory is the
cost allocation solution known as the core of a
cooperative game. The core consists of stable
cost allocation solutions which provide no in-
centive for any coalition of users to secede and
build their own subnetwork.
Let us first informally describe the relatedSteiner
Tree Network (STN) game, as previously con-
sidered in the literature. Given a complete net-
work G, the value of the characteristic function
for each subset of user nodes is defined as the
cost of the optimal (or best known) Steiner tree
in G which spans all the users of that subset. It
turns out that for the general case of the STN
game when not all nodes are receivers, stable
cost allocations do not necessarily exist (see,
for example, [15]). Some sufficient conditions
for their existence, as well as a heuristic algo-
rithm for finding core points of the STN game,
were presented in [5]). Some special cases were
also studied in [6]). For approximation results
on the STN problem, and their application to
associated cooperative games, see [16] and [17],
respectively. For a survey on related work see
[18].
Researchers have extensively studied a compu-
tationally less prohibitive special case of the
STN game in which users (receivers) reside at
all nodes. The associated cooperative games are
referred to as the class of Minimum Cost Span-
ning Tree (MCST) games. The non-emptiness
of the core of theMCST gamewas demonstrated
and analyzed in the literature (see, for example,
[19,4,20,21], and [22,23,24,25]). Note however,
that the entire core of the MCST game has not
yet been characterized [26].
Furthermore, several authors studied cost and
population monotonicity in the context of the
Minimum Cost Spanning Tree games. Infor-
mally, in those games the cost allocation scheme
is considered cost monotonic if the increase
(resp. decrease) of the cost of any edge would
not decrease (resp. increase) cost to any user.
On the other hand, the cost allocation scheme is
considered populationmonotonic if the addition
of a new user node would not increase the cost
to any of already existing users. For population
monotonicity and/or cost monotonicity see for
example, [27,28,29] and [30].
Since the Steiner tree problem is computation-
ally complex and since the Steiner Tree Net-
work (STN) game might have an empty core,
it seems reasonable to look for the solutions
that have other attractive properties and/or to
modify the game in order to make it computa-
tionally tractable. In particular, we will look
at the monotonicity properties in the Minimum
Cost Spanning Tree (MCST) game and in some
sense try to extend the considerations from the
MCST game to the STN game. The main ob-
jective of this paper is to develop a cost allo-
cation rule for the STN game or its modifica-
tion which has potential practical applications
in communication networks (for example, in
multicasting, see [31]). The input to our cost
allocation considerations is the optimal (or the
best known) Steiner tree network spanning the
source and all the receiver nodes. We then de-
fine the Modified Steiner Tree Network (MSTN)
game in characteristic function form. The value
of the characteristic function for each coalition
is the cost of the optimal Steiner Tree Network
(STN) spanning all members of that coalition in
the complete graph generated by all nodes (re-
ceivers and switching nodes) of the STN. This
definition is a modification of the characteris-
tic function of the STN game. The profound
difference between the two definitions is that,
in the general STN game, each coalition is also
allowed to use switching points which were not
even used by the grand coalition. The rationale
for such restriction and its practical implications
are discussed in [6].
[23] developed a cost allocation scheme for
the MCST game which is cost and population
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monotonic and thus creates points in the irre-
ducible core (see also, [4] and [26]).
Note that concepts of cost and populationmono-
tonic cost allocation scheme for theMCST game
can not be naturally extended to the Steiner tree
case due to a complex network structure created
with the inclusion of switching nodes. Specifi-
cally, the addition of another node (receiver or
switching node) might result in the elimination
of some other switching nodes from the optimal
or the best known Steiner tree network. Never-
theless, we extend some monotonicity consid-
erations of minimum cost spanning tree games
to a more general Steiner tree case, by develop-
ing a new cost allocation rule on Steiner trees
that satisfies certain network monotonicity. We
propose a cost allocation rule which gives no
incentive to any users to block network growth.
Namely, if an additional Steiner node is used in
the network and/or if an additional user joins
the network, the cost will not be increased to any
of already existing network users. The informal
outline of the rule follows.
The initial input to our considerations is the op-
timal (or the best known) Steiner tree in the
given network. If some Steiner nodes (switch-
ing nodes) are not used in the best known so-
lution, they are eliminated from the network.
In order to determine/estimate the value of the
inclusion of switching nodes in the network,
we use our known population and cost mono-
tonic cost allocation scheme for minimumspan-
ning trees as if all remaining Steiner nodes
were also users. Then, the cost allocated to
Steiner nodes is further distributed among ac-
tual user/receiver nodes in such a way that each
user pays a fraction of its benefit generated by
the inclusion of Steiner nodes.
Further, when an additional node (or a set of
nodes) is added to the network we find the min-
imum cost spanning tree in a new network. If
any leaf node or a whole subtree with the ex-
ception of its root consisted of non-user nodes,
we reduce the cost of edges of such subtrees to
zero. With this step we actually performed the
minimum cost spanning tree heuristic to find
the new Steiner tree. Then, we apply again
the above population and cost monotonic cost
allocation scheme for spanning trees as if all
nodes were users. Finally, we re-distribute the
cost of non-user nodes among user nodes in
such a way that each user pays at most a frac-
tion of its benefit generated by the inclusion of
new Steiner nodes. At this point we eliminate
non-used (leaf) Steiner nodes. With this rule
the entire cost of the new STN is allocated to
user nodes and neither of those users pay more
than they paid before the network expansion.
Namely, this cost allocation rule is monotonic
with respect to network growth.
Hence, the main contributions of this work
are: (1) the formulation of the population and
Steiner nodes monotonicity in the context of
the STN cost allocation problem and (2) the de-
velopment of a computationally tractable cost
allocation rule for generating some monotonic
cost allocation solutions for the above MSTN
game.
The remainder of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. In Section 2 we review some standard
definitions and introduce notation; in Section
3 we present some known preliminary results
from the literature. In Section 4 we discuss
the concept of monotonicity in the context of
the STN tree game and present the Steiner Tree
Network Cost Allocation (STNCA) algorithm. It
is demonstrated that the STNCA algorithm gen-
erates monotonic cost allocations for the MSTN
game. In Section 5, we illustrate the STNCA by
example. Finally, in Section 6, we summarize
our findings and contributions.
2. Basic Definitions
The Minimum Cost Steiner Tree problem for
directed graphs can be formulated as follows.
Given a directed weighted graph G′ = (D ∪
S′ ∪ {O},E) with an edge weight (cost) func-
tion w : E → R+, the origin O a set D of
demand nodes (users/receivers) and a set S′
of potential switch nodes (un-inhabited/Steiner
nodes), find a minimum cost directed Steiner
tree ST = (NST ,EST) in G, rooted away from
node O whose node set contains D, i.e.NST =
D ∪ S ∪ {O} andS ⊆′. Throughout this pa-
per we will assume that the weight function
for a graph G under consideration is symmet-
ric, w(i, j) = w(j, i), for all edges (i, j) ∈ E.
For such a symmetric case, solving the directed
Minimum Cost Steiner Tree problem is equiva-
lent to finding a minimum cost Steiner tree in
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the equivalent undirected weighted graph. It is
well-known that this problem is NP-hard [32].
The special case of the above problem in which
all nodes are receivers (S′ = ∅) is the widely
studied and computationally easier Minimum
Cost Spanning Tree Problem.
For our cost allocation considerations we will
use the concept of a cooperative game in the
characteristic function form. Let D be a set of
players and let us define the characteristic func-
tion c by c : 2|D| → R+, such that c(∅) = 0
and for each Q ⊆ D, c(Q) is the characteristic
function value. We can interpret c(Q) as the
cost of providing service to a set of users in Q.
Then, the pair (D, c) is a cooperative game.
For x ∈ R|D| and Q ⊆ D, let x(Q) ≡ ∑j∈Q xj
be the part of the total cost paid by coalition
Q. A cost allocation vector x in game (D, c)
satisfies x(D) = c(D), and the theory of coop-
erative games is concerned with the selection of
a reasonable subset of cost allocation vectors.
Central to the theory of cooperative games is
the solution concept referred to as the core of a
game. The core C(D, c) of a game (D, c) con-
sists of all cost allocation vectors x ∈ R|D|(x(D) =
c(D)), such that x(Q) ≤ c(Q) for all Q ⊆ D.
Observe that the core consists of all allocation
vectors x which provide no incentive for any
coalition to secede and create their own subnet-
work.
The vector x = (xi,J)i∈J,J⊆D is a population
monotonic cost allocation scheme [32] of the
game (D, c) if and only if it satisfies the follow-
ing conditions:
For each J ⊆ D,
∑
i∈J
xi,J = c(J) and (1)
For each J,K ⊆ D, and
i ∈ J, J ⊆ K ⇒ xi,J ≥ xi,K. (2)
Namely, if a new user joins the network and
the cost allocation scheme is applied, the cost
will not increase to any previously existing user.
None of the network users have incentive to
block the network growth.
The cost allocation scheme is said to be cost
monotonic if in the case of the decrease of any
single edge weight, no player cost will increase.
Equivalently, if any single edge weight is in-
creased, no player cost will decrease.
3. Preliminaries
Using the notation, from Section 2 input to
our cost allocation problem is the best known
Steiner tree ST = (D ∪ S ∪ {O},EST) in a
given complete weighted graph G′ = (D ∪
S′∪{O},E). We define the characteristic func-
tion cG as follows: cG : 2|D| → R+ is such
that cG(∅) = 0 and for each Q ⊆ D, cG(Q)
is the cost of the minimum Steiner tree span-
ning all nodes of Q in a complete graph G =
G(D ∪ S ∪ {O}) generated by the nodes of the
best known Steiner tree ST . We refer to the
game (D, cG) as to the Modified Steiner Tree
Network (MSTN) game. Note that in the gen-
eral Steiner Tree Network (STN) game, the char-
acteristic function is defined on the complete
graph G′ = G′(D ∪ S′) induced by the set of
nodes which includes all users and all potential
Steiner nodes. In the MSTN game each coali-
tion agrees to restrict their considerations to the
complete graph generated by nodes of the best-
known solution of the grand coalition. Clearly,
the value of the characteristic function for a par-
ticular coalition, as defined in the general STN
game, might seem more rational, since it allows
each coalition to consider the cheapest solution
in the entire network. However, the restric-
tion implied by the above modification reduces
some technical difficulties while still giving us
a reasonably good cost allocation model. These
trade-offs were discussed in [6].
It is well-known that the Minimum Cost Steiner
Tree problem in a directed weighted graph G′ =
(D ∪ S′ ∪ {O},E) can be formulated as an in-
teger programming problem [5]. For a directed
edge l = (i, j)we refer to i as the tail and j as the
head of l, and for a subset of nodes U ⊆ D∪′,
we denote by (U) the set of all directed edges
having their heads, but not their tails, in U. A
subset U ⊆ D∪S′, is said to be a cut-set of G, if
U ∩ D = ∅ and the undirected subgraph G(U)
of G induced by U is connected. We denote by
UD the set of all cut-sets of G. Then the Min
Cost Steiner Tree problem can be formulated as:
IP(D) : min
{
wu : u((U)) ≥ 1,
U ∈ UD, u ∈ {0, 1}E
}
,
where u ≡ u(i, j) = 1 if (i, j) ∈ E is used in the
directed Steiner tree ST, and 0 otherwise.
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Hence, the minimumcost of the directed Steiner
tree ST = (D ∪ S ∪ {O},E) is the best objec-
tive function value of the integer programming
problem IP(D). Denote by IP(Q), for Q ⊆ D,
the directed ST problem in the complete net-
work G = G(D ∪ S ∪ {O}) induced by nodes
of ST obtained from the original problem by re-
placing D with Q. Then, the pair (D, cG), where
cG : 2|D| → R+ is such that cG(∅) = 0 and for
each Q ⊆ D, cG(Q) is the minimum objective
function value of IP(Q), is the Modified Steiner
Tree Network (MSTN) game.
Consider now the linear programming relax-
ation LP(D) of IP(D) (the minimum cost di-
rected Steiner tree problem as defined above),
LP(D) : min{wu : u((U)) ≥ 1,U ∈ UD, u ≥








e ∈ (U)vU ≤ w(e), for all e ∈ E;
vU ≥ 0 for all U ∈ UD
}
.
It turns out that the dual DP(D) can be used to
allocate a fraction of the total cost of the Steiner
tree ST , while satisfying the core constraints of
the MSTN game. Namely, if vU,U ∈ UD, is
a feasible solution to DP(D), and if for each
U ∈ UD the amount vU is allocated arbitrar-
ily to users in U, then the cost allocation vec-
tor x generated by this operation satisfies the
core constraints. Indeed, for any subset of users
Q ⊆ D, cG(Q) =
∑
e ∈ ESTQw(e), where ESTQ
is the set of edges of the directed Steiner tree
STQ = (NSTQ ∪ {O},ESTQ) that spans Q ∪ {O}
in the complete network induced by nodes of
the best known Steiner tree ST . Then, by the









Remark: The above implies that for a special
case when S′ = ∅, i.e. for a spanning tree game,
packing algorithm [34] could be used to gener-
ate some core points of the spanning tree game.
[23] used this to develop a cost allocation scheme
for the MCST game which generates some core
points. Note, that the MSTCAS also identifies
the minimum spanning tree. For completeness,
we include herein the slightly modified outline
of their Minimum Spanning Tree Cost Alloca-
tion Scheme (MSTCAS).
MSTCAS Algorithm:
Input: A weighted complete network
G = (D ∪ {O},E, W(E)).
Initialization: Set the cost allocations xp=0, for
all p ∈ D, and all dual variables
vU = 0 for all cut-sets U ∈ UD.
Main Step:
“Find a potential allocating set U (the smallest in
size)”.
Do for k = 1, . . . |D|,
Do for each p ∈ D
Let U = {p}.
Do until |U| = k or no additional nodes
can be added to U
If ∃ (i, j) ∈ (U) such that w(i, j)=0,
i = O; let U = U ∪ {i}
EndDo
“Allocate to users in U as much as possible, divide
equally”
If for all e ∈ (U),w(e) ≥ 0
Let yU = min{w(e), e ∈ (U)}
Do for all p ∈ D




Do for all e ∈ (U)






[23] also showed that the above MSTCAS is cost
and population monotonic. [26] have shown
that a cost allocation scheme which is cost and
population monotonic produces points that co-
incide with the irreducible core of the MCST
game.
4. Steiner Tree Network Cost Allocation
(STNCA) Algorithm
In this section, we first discuss the steps of
the STNCA algorithm. Then we summarize the
STNCA algorithm and discuss its efficiency.
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In case when all network nodes except source
{O} are inhabited by users, it is known that the
MSTCAS from Section 3 constitutes a popula-
tion monotonic scheme. Consequently, adding
the additional set of users to the network and
applying MSTCAS would not increase the cost
to any already existing user and the new cost al-
location would be in the core of the new game.
Let us describe the above more formally. Con-
sider the game (D, cG) on G = G(D∪ {O},E).




The addition of a set of users U to the network
G would create a graph G1(D ∪ U ∪ {O},E).
Applying MSTCAS to the game (D ∪ U, cG1)
would for each j ∈ D ∪ U generate the core
cost allocation xj,D∪U. Due to the population
monotonicity of the MSTCAS, for each i ∈ D,
xi,D∪U ≤ xi,D.
Let us now go back to the original game (D, cG)
onG(D∪{O},E(D∪{O})) and consider adding
a non-empty set S of public (un-inhabited) nodes
to the network, thus creating an initial Steiner
tree network G1 = (D∪S∪O,E). It seems nat-
ural to assume that the coalition D would agree
on adding nodes S (all of them) only if that
addition is beneficial to the grand coalition D.
Consequently, we assume that the best Steiner
tree in G1 spans all the nodes in D∪S. Observe
that in the initial step we find the best (per-
haps optimal) Steiner tree using the best tool
available. In subsequent steps, when the net-
work grows and changes rapidly, we generate
new Steiner tree networks using more practical
minimum cost spanning tree heuristic.
Consider the minimum cost spanning tree game
(D ∪ S, c′G1) on G1 and apply to it the MSTCAS
scheme as if all nodes in D ∪ S were populated
with users. The result is the cost allocation
x′j,D∪S, for each j ∈ D ∪ S. The idea behind
this is to determine a reasonable cost for the
inclusion of each public node.





G1(D ∪ S) < cG(D)
= xD(D).
Note that we can assume the strict inequality,
since otherwise the set of Steiner nodes would
not be included into the network.
This implies that the total benefit of the inclu-
sion of Steiner nodes in the network to users in
D exceeds the cost assigned to switching nodes
i.e.,





Note also that since MSTCAS is population
monotonic, the individual benefit of the inclu-
sion of S in the network is (xj,D−x′j,D∪S) ≥ 0, for
all j ∈ D. We can assume that (xj,D− x′j,D∪S) >
0, for some j ∈ D since otherwise we would not
include the entire set S in the network.
Now consider the Steiner Tree Network (STN)
game (D, cG1) on G1 = (D ∪ S ∪ O,E).
Next we distribute the entire network cost to
actual users. The cost assigned to switching
nodes is determined above using our population
and cost monotonic cost allocation scheme for
spanning trees as x′D∪S(S). The addition of the
set of switching nodes S is overall beneficial to
users in D in the amount of xD(D)− x′D∪S(D),
where each user i benefits xi,D − x′i,D∪S. It
seems reasonable to distribute the cost assigned
to switching nodes in such a way that each user
pays a corresponding fraction of overall benefit
created by the addition of S. Namely, for each
i ∈ D, we allocate the cost as follows:










Moreover, the above implies that
∑
i∈D xi,D∪S =
x′D∪S(D) + x′D∪S(S) = cG1(D) meaning that the
entire cost was allocated and that no node had
incentive to block the addition of public nodes
in S to the network.
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4.1. Monotonicity of STN game with
respect to addition of Steiner nodes
Next we define the cost allocation rule in case
new Steiner nodes are added to the network.
When we add a new Steiner node or a set of
Steiner nodes to the existing STN, we will find
the newminimumcost STN using the quickmin-
imum cost spanning tree based heuristic. We
will actually use the MSTCAS applied to the net-
work as if all nodes were users to find that tree.
Note that this might eventually lead to the elim-
ination of some non-used Steiner nodes from
the STN. Clearly, that somewhat restricts the
generality of our cost allocation rule. Namely,
in the case of the network growth, we assume
herein the use of a quick heuristic and moreover
each subsequent cost allocation will depend on
the current one. Consequently, the STN under
consideration is not necessarily optimal and the
allocation is not independent of the sequence in
which the network is formed. Nevertheless, our
rule still addresses the likely practical situation
in which the quick decision on the addition of
potential new nodes should be made from the
point of view of the current solution.
Let us now add a set of public nodes T to net-
work G1 and create a network G2 = (D∪S∪T∪
{O},E). We find the minimum cost spanning
tree in G2 using the MSTCAS. If for any sub-
tree of that minimum cost spanning all non-root
nodes are Steiner nodes, we reduce the costs of
edges of such a subtree to zero. The cost of
this spanning tree is now equal to the cost of the
new STN since the new minimum cost STN will
be obtained by the elimination of leaf Steiner
nodes. If the cost of the new STN is not better
than the original one, we would stop the expan-
sion. Otherwise we repeat the MSTCAS as if all
nodes were users.







Since the addition of T improves the cost of STN
and sinceMSTCAS is population and costmono-




then we have xi,D∪S∪T ≤ x′i,D∪S∪T + xi,D∪S −
x′i,D∪S∪T , which implies that xi,D∪S∪T ≤ xi,D∪S,
for all i ∈ D and the entire cost is allocated, i.e.
cG2(D) = xD∪S∪T(D).
At this point we would also remove all non-used
(Steiner leafs) public nodes from the network
G2.
Hence, our cost allocation rule is monotonic
with respect to the addition of public nodes.
4.2. Monotonicity of STN game with
respect to addition of users
Let us now turn to the network expansion cre-
ated by the addition of new users. As already
mentioned, if all nodes are users, the MSTCAS
is population monotonic.
Consider now again the Modified Steiner Tree
Network game (D, cG1) on G1 = (D∪S∪O,E),
and the cost for each i ∈ D given as follows:





Suppose now that a set of users U is joining the
network, thus creating a network G3 =(D∪U∪
S,E). Consider the game (D ∪ U ∪ S, c′) and
apply to it the MSTCAS scheme as if all nodes
in S were also populated with users.
Note that once again for practical purposes we
work as if the entire set of un-inhabited nodes
S is included in the best solution. Actually, we
find the minimum spanning tree which spans
D ∪ U ∪ S and allocate its cost. If all leafs of
this minimum spanning tree are receivers this
tree is our best STN. Otherwise, we further im-
prove the STN by reducing the weights of all
subtrees that do not contain receivers (except
for the root) down to zero. Cost monotonicity
of our minimum cost spanning tree cost allo-
cation scheme assures that this only further re-
duces the cost to all nodes. If x′D∪U∪S(S) = 0







for each i ∈ D and xu,D∪U∪S = x′u,D∪U∪S, for
u ∈ U.
By construction, and population and cost mono-
tonicity of the MSTCAS,
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which together with x′D∪U∪S(S) > 0 implies




> 0 and to-
gether with xj,D∪S − x′j,D∪U∪S ≥ 0 for all j, in
turn implies that:
xi,D∪U∪S ≤ xi,D∪S, for all i ∈ D and xD∪U∪S(D∪
U)= cG3(D ∪U).
Hence, our cost allocation rule is monotonic
with respect to the addition of newusers. Namely,
there is no incentive for any user to block the
addition of new users to the network.
Next we present an outline of the STNCA algo-
rithm.
Remark (The complexity of the STNCA
Algorithm)
The input network has |N+1| nodes and |N|∗∗2
+|N| edges. The algorithm runs the MSTCAS,
identifies Steiner leafs and reduces appropriate
links, reapplies the MSTCAS and finally does a
simple cost allocation computational operation
for each node. It was reported by [23] that the
MSTCAS can be implemented so that for any
given k, the algorithm examines at most n links
for each of n nodes. Since k takes on the values
STNCA Algorithm
Input: A Steiner tree ST = (D ∪ S ∪ {O},EST), with a set of users D and non-leaf
Steiner tree nodes S in a weighted complete network
G = (D ∪ S ∪ {O}) and the cost for each i ∈ D given as follows:




Main Step: If a set of Steiner nodes T is added to the network we consider a complete
network G(N) = G(D ∪ S ∪ T ∪ {O}).
Perform The MSTCAS on G(N).
The output is: x
′
i,D∪S∪T for all i ∈ D ∪ S ∪ T and the minimum
cost spanning tree MCST in G.
If any leaf subtree of MCST does not contain users,
reduce its edge weights to zero.
If the total cost of MCST is not smaller than the
cost of ST stop,
otherwise repeat the MSTCAS on G(N).
EndIf
For each i ∈ D,




Eliminate Steiner leaf nodes (leaf subtrees) from the network.
EndIf.
If a set of users U is added to the network we consider a complete network
G(N) = G(D ∪ U ∪ S ∪ {O}).
Perform The MSTCAS on G(N).
The output is: x
′
i,D∪U∪S for all i ∈ D ∪ U ∪ S and the minimum
cost spanning tree MCST in G.
If any leaf subtree of MCST does not contain users, reduce
its edge weights to zero and repeat MSTCAS on G(N).
EndIf




and for u ∈ U, xu,D∪U∪S = x′u,D∪U∪S.
Eliminate Steiner leaf nodes (leaf subtrees) from the network.
EndIf.
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1 through |N|, the running time of the MSTCAS
is O(|N|3). The identification of Steiner leafs
involves the inspection of at most |N|+ 1 links
for |N| nodes. Hence, the overall complexity of
the STNCA algorithm is O(|N|3).
5. Illustration of STNCA Algorithm
We start the illustration with a trivial single user
network presented in Figure 1 and then in Fig-
ures 2 to 6 we go through several network ex-
pansions. In Figures 3 to 6 we assume that
networks are complete and that the edges not
included have very high costs.
The initial network in Figure 1 has a single al-




Figure 1. The initial network.
Then, user U2 joins the network (see, Figure
2). The STNCA algorithm results in the cost
of spanning network c(D) = 18 (bold links)
and the cost allocation vector (x(U1), x(U2)) =
(9, 9). The cost to user U1 was reduced and the
cost allocation is in the core of the associated
STN game.
We further expand the network by adding the set
of Steiner nodes {S1, S2} (see Figure 3). The
new Steiner tree is found by the minimum span-




Figure 2. Add {U2}.
first found by MSTCAS and then the cost of link
(U2, S2) was reduced to zero. The cost of the
Steiner tree is improved to c(D) = 3.6. Then
we perform our STNCA rule and obtain the new
cost allocation (x(U1), x(U2)) = (1.82, 1.78).
At the end of the process we remove S2 from
the network.
By this operation, we achieved the cost reduc-
tion to both users. Moreover, in this example,
the cost allocation is still the core allocation.
Observe that although S2 is removed from the
network, it played some role in the cost allo-
cation. Consequently, the cost allocation is not
symmetric. In some sense U2 got some credit
for giving up the potential of using S2.
The addition of user U3 is presented in Figure
4. After applying the SETNCA algorithm, the
new cost allocation (x(U1), x(U2), x(U3)) =
(1.82, 1.78, 8) is obtained. It is also a core allo-
cation. Moreover, U1 and U2 did not incur any
additional cost for this expansion. One could
perhaps argue that U3 is entering the network
at a relatively low price. U3 appears to be far
away from the source and is only paying to link
itself to U2. Nevertheless, U1 and U2 would
c(D) = 3.6
x′(U1) = 1 + 0.15 = 1.15
x′(U2) = 0.9 + 0.05 + 0.15 = 1.1
x′(S1) = 1 + 0.15 = 1.15
x′(S2) = 0.9 + 0.05 + 0.15− 1− 0.9 = 0.2
x(U1) = 1.15 + (9− 1.15) · 1.35/(18− 2.2.25) = 1.82
x(U2) = 1.1 + (9− 1.1) · 1.35/(18− 2.25) = 1.78
S2 is removed from the network.
Figure 3. Add {S1, S2}, remove {S2}.
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c(D) = 11.6
x′(U1) = 1 + 0.2 = 1.2
x′(U2) = 1 + 0.2 = 1.2
x′(U3) = 8
x′(S1) = 1 + 0.2 = 1.2
x(U1) = 1.2 + (1.82− 1.2) · 1.2/(3.6− 2.4) = 1.82
x(U2) = 1.2 + (1.78− 1.2) · 1.2/(3.6− 2.4) = 1.78
x(U3) = 8
Figure 4. Add {U3}.
not block, since there is no cost to them. More-
over, it might be beneficial for them to have
U3 in the network and potentially achieve bet-
ter reductions associated with future network
expansions.
In the next step we add to the network a set
of Steiner nodes {S3, S4} (see Figure 5). Note
that for this network the core of the STN game
is empty (as demonstrated in Figure 5).
The MSTCAS finds the spanning tree and al-
locates the cost as if the Steiner nodes were
users. After finding that S1 is a leaf, we reduce
the cost allocated to S1 by the weight of link
(U1, S1). (It is easy to verify that in this case
this is equivalent to the operation in which we
would reduce the cost of link (U1, S1) to zero
and then repeat the MSTCAS). This, tree based
heuristic determined the minimum cost Steiner
tree with the total cost c(D) = 5 (bold links).
Here, we find that S1 is a leaf which should
be eliminated. However, we do not remove it
immediately. Since the cost of Steiner tree was
reduced from the previous network from Figure
4, we apply SETNCA rule to allocate the cost of
c(D) = 5, note that the core is empty since
x(U1) + x(U2)⇐ 3.6
x(U2) + x(U3)⇐ 3
x(U3) + x(U1)⇐ 3
Hence,




x′(S1) = 1− 1
x′(S3) = 1
x′(S4) = 1
x(U1) = 1 + (1.82− 1) · 2/(11.6− 3) = 1.191
x(U2) = 1 + (1.78− 1) · 2/(11.6− 3) = 1.181
x(U3) = 1 + (8− 1) · 2/(11.6− 3) = 2.628
S1 is removed.
Figure 5. Add {S3, S4}, remove {S1}.
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Steiner nodes (including S1) to user nodes and
then eliminate S1 from the network.
The cost allocation is now (x(U1), x(U2), x(U3))
= (1.191, 1.181, 2.628). Thus, the cost has
been reduced to all users. Observe that the core
of the MSTN game (when S1 is eliminated) is
not empty. It can be verified that (2, 2, 1) is
in the core of the MSTN game. The cost allo-
cation generated by our rule is not in the core
of the MSTN game, since the core constraint
x(U3) ≤ 2 is violated.
Finally we add a set of Steiner nodes {S5, S6}
(see Figure 6). We apply the minimum cost
spanning tree heuristic to find the new Steiner
tree (indicated in bold on Figure 6) with overal
cost c(D) = 4.1. Consequently, we will elimi-
nate S5 from the network. It can be verified that
the core of the associated MSTN game (with
S5 eliminated) is not empty and that it con-
tains cost allocation (1.3, 1.4, 1.4). Note how-
ever that in this case the spanning tree heuristic
is performing poorly and we are actually not
making the optimal decision. Namely, the opti-
mal Steiner tree includes {S5, S6} and excludes
{S3, S4} and has the optimal overall cost of 3.9.
Note that for this network the cost allocation
(1.3, 1.3, 1.3) is in the core of the STN game.
It can be verified that the application of the
SETNCA algorithm results in a new cost alloca-
tion (x(U1), x(U2), x(U3)) = (1.11, 1.09, 1.9)
in which all users again achieved a cost reduc-
tion. However, this cost is not optimal and the
cost allocation is not in the core.
An interesting avenue for the future research
should include the search for a populationmono-
tonic rule that would produce core allocations
whenever they exist and/or be as close as pos-
sible to the core.
6. Conclusion
We analyzed the cost allocation associated with
the Steiner Tree Network (STN) problem. In
particular, we are interested in the cost allo-
cation strategy associated with a potential net-
work growth. It is well known that the opti-
mization part of the problem is computationally
hard (NP-hard) and that the game theoretic so-
lution concepts are difficult to analyze and/or
compute (for example core might be empty).
Consequently, for practical situations when the
network is quickly growing, we suggest the use
of a simple heuristic for the optimization part
and a modification/simplification of the game
for the cost allocation analysis. Specifically, we
use a minimum cost spanning tree heuristic to
find the minimum cost STN which is the input
to our cost allocation problem. We also modify
the STN game. The idea of the modification is
to restrict strategic considerations to the nodes
used in the best known Steiner tree solution.
Namely, the value of the characteristic function
c(D) = 0.7 + 0.2 + 0.2 + 1 + 1 + 1 = 4.1
Core is not empty, it contains:
(x(U1), x(U2), x(U3)) = (1.3, 1.4, 1.4)




x′(S3) = 0.2 + 0.166 = 0.366
x′(S4) = 0.2 + 0.166 = 0.366
x′(S6) = 0.2 + 0.166 = 0.366
x(U1) = 1 + (1.191− 1) · 1.1/(5− 3) = 1.11
x(U2) = 1 + (1.181− 1) · 1.1/(5− 3) = 1.09
x(U3) = 1 + (2.628− 1) · 1.1/(5− 3) = 1.9
Figure 6. Add {S5, S6}, remove {S5}.
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for a particular coalition of receiver nodes is de-
fined as the cost of the best solution they could
achieve in the complete network generated by
nodes of the best known Steiner tree.
Under the above assumptions we develop a cost
allocation rule which is, in some sense, the ex-
tension of our known population and cost mono-
tonic cost allocation scheme on spanning trees
to Steiner tree networks. The new rule has
the following desirable monotonic property. If
some new nodes (users and/or useful switch-
ing nodes) are added to the STN, or the cost of
some links was reduced, our cost allocation rule
assures that the cost is not increased to any pre-
viously existing users. Namely, no users would
have an incentive to block the network growth
in terms of the addition of new users and would
have no incentive to block any improvement
that could be achieved by the addition of new
switching nodes, or by the reduction of cost of
some links. Moreover the rule is simple and
enables the quick computation of the relatively
attractive cost allocation.
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